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dc.contributor.authorDe Giovanni, Domenico
dc.contributor.authorLamantia, Fabio
dc.contributor.authorPezzino, Mario
dc.date.accessioned2019-11-04T12:15:53Z
dc.date.available2019-11-04T12:15:53Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.citationStructural Change and Economic Dynamics. 2019, vol. 50, p. 79-89.cs
dc.identifier.issn0954-349X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10084/138911
dc.description.abstractThe paper studies the dynamics of compliance in a population of agents that decide whether to engage in tax evasion depending on an evolutionary adaptation process, when payoffs are assumed to have the realistic features of Prospect Theory utilities. The paper also considers the optimal control problem of a tax authority that targets the maximization of the expected stream of tax revenues choosing auditing effort. The analysis produces novel and rich results, including conditions for the convergence to an asymptotically stable interior equilibrium, the existence of multiple equilibria and discontinuities in the optimal control.cs
dc.language.isoencs
dc.publisherElseviercs
dc.relation.ispartofseriesStructural Change and Economic Dynamicscs
dc.relation.urihttp://doi.org/10.1016/j.strueco.2019.05.004cs
dc.rights© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.cs
dc.subjecttax evasioncs
dc.subjectProspect theorycs
dc.subjectoptimal controlcs
dc.subjectauditingcs
dc.subjectevolutionary dynamicscs
dc.titleA behavioral model of evolutionary dynamics and optimal regulation of tax evasioncs
dc.typearticlecs
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.strueco.2019.05.004
dc.type.statusPeer-reviewedcs
dc.description.sourceWeb of Sciencecs
dc.description.volume50cs
dc.description.lastpage89cs
dc.description.firstpage79cs
dc.identifier.wos000487567300008


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